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SOMETIMES SUSPECTr: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR GOLDBERG-AMBROSE

David Williams*

I appreciate the care and thoroughness with which Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose has approached Indians as Peoples and the opportunity to respond to her many acute comments. First let me
emphasize our common ground, because I think that it is substantial. We share the same basic goals: we each believe ourselves to be
"committed to racial justice and profoundly troubled by America's
treatment of Indian peoples," 1 and we each seek to "create a legal
regime that promotes self-determination for Indian groups without
compromising the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution."' 2 Yet we also believe that Indian law rests on racial classifica3
tions, or "race-plus" a political element. So we agree that the
Supreme Court's 4analysis of Indian law-that it does not involve
race-is in error.
But if Indian law does involve racial classifications, how can
we protect both Indians' special status and the antidiscrimination
norms of the Constitution? It is on this strategic-analytical question
Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples",
39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 172 (1991).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 172-73.
4. I should note that Indians as Peoples does not portray Indian law as "indefensible under basic American principles of racial equality." Id. at 169. It does argue that
if the Court applied the same standards to Title 25 as it does to other race-based legislation, it would strike down that part of the title that could not be justified as affirmative
action and, arguably, most of the title would so fall. See Williams, The Borders of the
Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 764-67 (1991).
But I also observe that one could read the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment in ways that would allow broad protection for all minority groups, see id.
at 824-26; and Indiansas Peoples itself argues that most of Indian law is consistent with
"basic American principles of racial equality," because those principles, rightly understood, do not prohibit protection for peoplehood. See id. at 841-50.
*
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that we differ. I agree with Professor Goldberg-Ambrose that "anyone engaged in that struggle should place history and context ahead
of abstract reasoning and inventive formulations" 5-but I think
that history and context would lead us away from her proposed
analysis, which promises only more of the present regime. She has,
however, convinced me that there is not one perfect path through
this thicket-only better and worse ones. My response therefore is
necessarily comparative. I cannot pretend that my approach is
without its problems, but I still believe that it is preferable to the
most familiar alternatives.
In particular, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose proposes a "direct" route to deal with the equal protection problem raised by Indian legislation. She would recognize that the Constitution itself
singles out Indians in the Indian Commerce Clause as a special area
of congressional power-and thereby implicitly legitimates the
practice of Indian-specific legislation. 6 Standing alone, however,
that path would free Congress to help or hurt tribes, free of any
restriction from the equal protection norm. So Professor GoldbergAmbrose adds a standard of review to the article I approach: Congress may single out Indians only in a manner consistent with its
fiduciary obligation to them. 7 As she notes, I find this approach
unpersuasive on textual, historical, and policy grounds. Her defense sets out powerful and cogent arguments, but I do not believe
that it adequately shores up the flawed foundations of her approach.
Indians as Peoples offers a different strategy: the Fourteenth
Amendment, as incorporated by the Fifth Amendment to apply to
Congress, does bar Indian-specific legislation as a general rule. The
Amendment, however, also contains an important exception to this
rule: it recognizes that to some extent tribes are separate peoples
and thus fall outside the domestic norms of the Constitution. Congress may therefore single Indians out in support of their
peoplehood but only in support of their peoplehood. This approach, in my view, proceeds more naturally from the language and
history of the Constitution and offers more meaningful protection
for tribal self-determination than the article I approach.
5. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 190.
6. See id. at 174.
7. See id. at 176-77.
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I.

TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION

As regards the text of the Constitution, Indians as Peoples suggests that the Equal Protection Clause,8 with its principle against
racial classification, may have superseded the Indian Commerce
Clause, with its recognition of Congress' power to single out tribes,
9
because it is "later in time and is no less specific." Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose concedes that the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted later than article I, but questions whether it is equally specific. 10 Even under her analysis, then, the relative preeminence of
the two provisions is problematic, with age and specificity pointing
in different directions. Text alone seems an unreliable guide, and
we therefore must look to different sources of constitutional
norms-policy and history-as Professor Goldberg-Ambrose eventually does. This conclusion was the point of my argument about
the Indian Commerce Clause: the bare text just does not help us
very much; one cannot invoke article I and declare the matter settled.II That is why my proposal-while beginning with the text12 Inreally revolves around the twin poles of history and policy.
deed, I assume that Professor Goldberg-Ambrose agrees with me
that text should not be the central factor in this equation, because as
I will argue, she offers a standard of review-consistency with the
trust responsibility-that has no rootage in text.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose seems, however, to be making a
stronger argument: the text is so specific that it leads one to the
article I approach regardless of policy and the teachings of history.
8. This clause does not apply to the federal government, but its substance has for
the most part been reverse incorporated against it through the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose does not affirmatively argue
against reverse incorporation, so I assume that such an argument is not the basis of her
response. She does observe: "It is odd in the first place for Professor Williams to read
the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable only to the states, as potentially nullifying a
federal article I power." Id. at 175. But it is no odder than reading the Amendment to
restrict Congress' ability to discriminate under any of its other powers. She also points

out that the Equal Protection Clause has not been reverse incorporated against Congress' treatment of aliens, see id. at 174 n.26, but I argue in Indians as Peoples that
aliens and Indians are in different circumstances regarding reverse incorporation. See
Williams, supra note 4, at 811-13. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose does not respond to

this argument. Perhaps she simply means here to repeat her specificity argument: the
Amendment should not be reverse incorporated in this context, because the Indian
Commerce Clause is more specific than the Equal Protection Clause. I address that

argument in the text.
9. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 174.

10. See id.
11. See Williams, supra note 4, at 784-86.

12. See id. at 830-50.
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Here we must part company. Article I does specifically legitimate
Indian-specific legislation;1 3 but read in historical context, the
Equal Protection Clause commands equality between the races.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose denies that the Equal Protection
Clause "expressly address[es] racial classifications," 14 and in a literal sense, she is right. But that point, I think, demonstrates the
inadequacy of a purely textual approach to this issue, because it
denies the whole context of the provision. It is certainly true that
the language-"nor shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 1 5-- does not expressly
mention race. In context, however, the Fourteenth Amendment is
all about race; the idea that the Amendment is not about race because the language does not mention race ignores the greatest wa6
tershed event in nineteenth century American history.'
One of Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's examples illustrates this
point: she suggests that the equal protection norm would not apply
"with full force" to a federal law requiring Indians to ride in the
back of interstate buses.' 7 Perhaps she believes that her trust responsibility standard of review would block such a law, but that
analysis misses the point: this law seems unconstitutional not only,
and perhaps not primarily, because Congress has neglected its trust
responsiblity. In the context of the history of this country, this law
is unconstitutional because it is racist legislation, plain and simple.
Moreover, if one is looking only at the specific language of the Constitution, the trust responsibility standard is in serious difficulty, because, as I will argue, it has no basis in the language of the
document.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers one last argument about
specificity: as Robert Clinton noted some years ago,' the Fourteenth Amendment itself specifically mentions Indians by its exclu13. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 174.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

16. Alternatively, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose may mean that the Amendment
does address race but not racial classifications; in other words, it creates an ideal of
substantive equality among racial groups-an ideal that may sometimes require formal
racial classifications. As I note in Indians as Peoples, I applaud that reading. I chose
not to make that argument only because others have done so and I think that one can
defend the special status of Indians without recourse to such a broad and controversial
argument. See Williams, supra note 4, at 823-26.
17. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 174-75.
18. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of FederalProtection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1011 n.201 (1981).
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19
sion of "Indians not taxed" from the apportionment. I find this
language very relevant-indeed I build my proposal around it2O

but not for the reasons Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers. She argues that the language of the "Indians not taxed" clause simply affirms the relationship between the federal government and the tribes
in article 1.21 Again, however, this strictly textual argument is unsatisfying. By its terms, the Amendment excludes only Indians not
taxed, but all Indians are taxed today.22 Indeed, the Department of
Interior's current interpretation of this clause is that all Indians are
included in the apportionment because the federal government taxes
them all. 23 If one paid attention only to language, then, one would
conclude that the "Indians not taxed" clause cannot ground a special relationship between Congress and any Indians, because it now
applies to no Indians at all.
I rush to admit that this focus on language is wooden and rigid.
"Indians not taxed" really means "tribal Indians," but the only way
that we can know that is to look at the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When we do so, however, we discover the reason the
drafters of the Amendment excluded Indians from apportionment:
the tribes were different peoples, not part of the constitutional fabric
not subject to constitutional norms in the same way as
of the nation,
24
others.
II.

HISTORY

So arguments about the textual preeminence of article I or the
Equal Protection Clause seem to be a wash for the article I approach and are generally unilluminating. We must then turn to history and policy. In the historical debates surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment, I found the basis for the Indians-as-peoples approach. I rehearse those debates at length in my original
article, 25 so I will not repeat that discussion here. By contrast, I
find no suggestion that article I imposes on Congress a fiduciary

duty or that the "Indians not taxed" language does anything other
than exclude tribes from the constitutional regime for citizens.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 175.
See Williams, supra note 4, at 832-33.
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 175.
See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956).

23. 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974, at 995 (1979).
24. See Williams, supra note 4, at 832-41.
25. See id.
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Indeed, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose does not make a historical argument for her article I approach; instead, she offers several
arguments against my historical account. In particular, she points
out that my historical argument grows out of debates over the Citizenship Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause applies to "persons," not "citizens." Therefore, in her view, the citizenship
debates are not relevant to the latter clause: "Indians as Peoples
asks its readers to view the Fourteenth Amendment as an integrated
whole, but such a general admonition cannot substitute for the close
work of interpreting each clause. '' 26 Despite this characterization,
Indians as Peoples does interpret "each clause," but it also argues
that one should intepret each clause in light of the meaning of the
other clauses.
In particular, Indians as Peoples recognizes that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all "persons" and therefore grants Indian

individuals some rights. 27 The debates over the Citizenship Clause,
however, should influence our interpretation of the scope of those
rights. Because the debates reveal a view of the tribes as peoples
outside the domestic norms of the Constitution, no part of the
Fourteenth Amendment should be read as inconsistent with the Indians' peoplehood. That mode of analysis does suggest that we
should read the Amendment as an integrated whole. But as a historical matter-and I am here advancing a historical argumentthe framers did so view the Amendment, and I do not know of a
historian who takes a different view. 28 Moreover, if viewing the
Amendment as an integrated whole is a sin, Professor Goldberg26. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1,at 185-86 (footnote omitted).
27. See Williams, supra note 4, at 839-41, 863-64; infra notes 31-33.
28. See id. at 839 & n.264. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose further argues that the
debates over the Citizenship Clause are irrelevant to a historical exegesis of the Equal
Protection Clause, because the latter was addressed only to state action. Under this
view, the drafters might have excluded Indians from federal citizenship because of their
special status, but then in the Equal Protection Clause they might have banned state
laws that single out Indians in recognition of their special status. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 184-86. But that hypothetical mental construct is hard to accept: the Citizenship Clause excludes Indians from state as well as federal citizenship,
from state as well as federal polities. It contemplates that laws recognizing separate
peoplehood are not inherently illegitimate; such statutes do not suffer from the same
evils as racist legislation prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. The framers could
not, then, have intended to block state statutes that, for example, exempted tribal Indians from military conscription, in recognition of their separate status. They did, on the
other hand, intend to bar state statutes that single out Indians based on their race-such
as laws denying equal protection in the courts to individual Indians "sojourning" offreservation. See Williams, supra note 4, at 839-41. The clause, then, never blocked
peoplehood-protective statutes; and when reverse incorporated against the federal government, it does not block federal peoplehood-protective statutes.
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Ambrose is herself guilty: she offers the "Indians not taxed" language, which is in the Apportionment Clause, as a reason to believe
that the Equal Protection Clause does not change Congress' special
benefit of any
relationship to the Indians-and she does so without
29
history.
legislative
the
to
accompanying citation
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose also makes several arguments
that emphasize recent judicial expansion of the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause-suggesting, apparently, that argument
based on the 1868 legislative debates is dated. First, she objects that
equal protection has evolved toward greater inclusiveness, "particu30
larly embracing aliens."' But again, I do not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment has ever excluded Indians--or aliensaltogether: it always extended them some rights, to the extent that
they fall under non-Indian jurisdiction and therefore need those
rights. 3 ' Professor Goldberg-Ambrose criticizes this suggestion as
"old-fashioned": "Indiansas Peoples takes an old-fashioned view of
equal protection when it tries to section the clause like a grapefruit,
applying only certain portions to Indians. . ,,32 But if "old-fashioned" means closed, rigid, or restrictive, I must differ: Indians as
Peoples specifically argues that the standard is inherently evolutionary and always has been-the rights are as great as the need that
evokes them. As the federal government takes more direct jurisdiction over individual Indians, displacing the tribal governments, so
must the rights of those individuals against the federal government
increase. 33 Finally, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose argues that Indians should be included in constitutional citizenship because of
"contacts or bonds with the national community." Further, "[i]f
Indians are not excluded from constitutional citizenship, it is difficult to understand why they should be excluded from equal protection."'34 But if Indian law is race-based, the tribes must be excluded
from some of equal protection for a full-fledged self-determination
policy to survive. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose herself recommends exclusion of Indian-specific statutes from strict scrutiny
under the article I approach. Indians as Peoples, moreover, emphasizes that Indians now have statutory citizenship that constitution"..

29. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 175.

30. Id. at 185.
31. See Williams, supra note 4, at 839-41, 863-64.
32. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 185.
33. See Williams, supra note 4, at 839-41, 863-64. For example, as the federal
courts now try Indians for many on-reservation crimes, these individuals should receive
the full panoply of constitutional rights extended to criminal defendants.
34. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 186.
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ally cannot be rescinded and that brings with it all constitutional
35
rights consistent with tribal self-determination.
III.

POLICY

Perhaps, however, policy concerns should loom largest in this
discussion. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers critiques of three
policy objections that I make to the article I approach: it would
breach the "normative wall of opposition to racial classifications"; it
would frustrate benign state Indian-protective legislation; and it
would leave Indian peoples vulnerable to race-based federal action.
I regard the third as the most important and Professor GoldbergAmbrose's critique of it the most significant, so I take it up last for
extended consideration.
First, I fear that the Court's approach in Mancari-denying
that Indian law is race-based-will encourage a fast-and-loose attitude toward the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, because the approach is so palpably a fiction. Indians are racial
groups; to ignore that fact is to suggest that we can ignore the antidiscrimination norm when it proves inconvenient.3 6 Unlike the
Court, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose wants to admit that Indian
law is race-based; but she then argues that article I nonetheless legitimates singling out Indians. I see much less risk of devaluation
of the antidiscrimination norm in this approach, and so on this
score I prefer her analysis to the Court's-because it is more honest.
I do see some risk of devaluation of the norm in her approach,
however, because it would essentially hold that Indians enjoy a special status under article I, alone among the country's racial minorities. And I see this exception, despite Professor GoldbergAmbrose's arguments, 37 as qualitatively different from other apparent exceptions. Aliens are radically different from Indians because
they have, at least theoretically, an exit option and their status is
caught up in the hard-ball of international politics. 38 By comparison to Title 25, affirmative action is theoretically temporary, integrationist in its goals, and relatively minor in its effects on the
minorities involved. 39 Title 25 alone seems to legitimate permanent
separation of American citizens into racially exclusive enclaves
under different governments. Therefore, while Professor Goldberg35. See Williams, supra note 4, at 857-61.
36. See id. at 762, 774.

37. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 180-81.
38. See Williams, supra note 4, at 812-13.
39. See id. at 764-67.
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Ambrose is right to suggest that her approach would not "cause the
legal barriers against racism to crumble,"'' ° it likely would have
some negative effect in that direction.
I completely agree, however, with Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's belief that some "race-plus" classifications are more innocuous than others: "This is especially the case with federal legislation
regarding Indians, which acknowledges governments and groups
that originally served as the basis for international negotiations and
only later became associated with domestic law. [T]he fact that
politics is added to race defuses the force of race .... -41 But that
comment, I think, is a recapitulation of the essential thesis of Indians as Peoples: the reason that tribes are unique in the eyes of the
Constitution is that they are peoples in polities that predate the
Constitution. Within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, Indians alone occupy this status, and so with Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose I think that this approach would create relatively minimal risk of other kinds of racial legislation.
My second policy objection is that the article I approach would
allow only Congress to single out Indians because only Congress
has the requisite article I powers, and I find that "regrettable because it discourages or prevents state legislation supporting tribal
[if] Indian legislation is justifiable without
self-determination ....
strict scrutiny when it is federal, why should it not be similarly justifiable when enacted by a state?" 42 Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's
principal response is that there is reason to distinguish between
state and federal governments: as bad as Congress has been to the
Indians, the states have been worse. Moreover, the federal trust reponsibility offers some promise that federal treatment will continue
to be "good": "If properly understood and invigorated, the trust
responsibility can serve in lieu of strict scrutiny as a curb on legislation singling out Indians or tribes for harmful treatment. ' 43 I agree
with Professor Goldberg-Ambrose that states have mistreated Indians, but that is no reason to block state legislation when on occasion
it is benign; in particular, it would be regrettable to discourage
grass-roots state-tribal cooperation. And I think that my standard
accommodates that goal: it would block malign state-or federalaction, but allow support for self-determination. By contrast, I do
40. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 181.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 182.
43. Id. at 183.
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not think that the trust responsibility has, will, or can prevent federal mistreatment.
This issue thus merges into the third and most important policy concern: trying to discern which legal formulation might in
practice best protect the tribes. As Professor Goldberg-Ambrose
observes, my chief objection to the article I option is "the vulnerability of Indians to federal power if strict scrutiny is pushed
aside." 44 But she suggests that an article I approach will not leave
Indians so exposed: Congress must still live by "the doctrine the
Supreme Court has most often invoked as a restraint on federal
power--the

trust

responsibility.

'45

I

agree

with

Professor

Goldberg-Ambrose's basic view of how the Court goes about its
work and how one might best try to protect the tribes. As she observes, commentators have offered many methods for stimulating
judicial protection of the tribes. But
[u]ltimately, any means of protecting Indian resources and selfgovernment that relies on the Supreme Court depends on the values and contextual understanding of the Justices, reverberating
with prior legal doctrinal tradition .... What matters is whether

the magic words point judges in the direction of carefully scrutinizing the consequences of decisions from the perspectives of all
those affected and whether they tap into a set 46
of norms and traditions that stimulate critical judicial thought.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose here draws on the recent work of
those who argue that judicial decisionmaking centrally involves
practical reason. 47 These scholars are emphatically antifoundationalist: they deny that any concept, set of propositions, or factor (such
as legislative intent) can offer a basis from which judges can derive
outcomes. Instead, "[j]udicial interpretation is driven... by a complex, interactive assessment and reassessment of a multitude of factors-a 'to and fro movement' that continuously tests potential
interpretations against the legal interpretive community's web of
beliefs."

48

44. Id. at 176.
45. Id.
46. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 178 (footnotes omitted).
47. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose relies directly on Frickey, CongressionalIntent,
Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 1137 (1990), but practical reason, pragmatism and contextual analysis are concepts that have affected other doctrinal areas, see, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24-36 (1986); and disciplines other than law,
see R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983); M. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990).

48. Frickey, supra note 47, at 1218.
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Again, then, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose and I are in agreement on the task at hand: the problem is how to "tap into a set of
norms and traditions" that will cause the Court to think more critically. But again, we disagree on the best way to complete that task.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers only one argument for the trust
obligation as a likely effective limit on Congress: "From this perspective, the idea of a trust responsibility may be at least as serviceable as any other."'49 This view seems to suggest that there should
be one answer to the vulnerability of Indians-the trust responsibility-rather than many overlapping and mutually supportive ones.
But that reductionist attitude is in tension with the ideal of practical
reason that Professor Goldberg-Ambrose seems to endorse. Practical reason is inherently open-ended; it requires us to consider all of
the decisional factors relevant to each complex situation.
Under this ideal, in my view, the trust responsibility and the
Indians-as-peoples approach should both occupy a significant position in Indian law, serving different ends and reflecting different
truths. The trust responsibility recognizes the moral duty owed to
the Indians, but peoplehood recognizes another moral concern, the
importance of self-determination to the tribes. In addition, as Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers it, the trust responsibility will have
its primary effect as a rule of statutory interpretation: according to
the traditional canons, courts construe statutes in favor of the Indians. 50 By contrast, peoplehood is a constitutional doctrine: under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the government must either preserve
tribal self-determination or extend to them strict scrutiny. In its
principal function, the trust responsibility thus serves to guide the
interpretation of statutes; peoplehood, on the other hand, would
serve as a basis for constitutionally invalidating them. For that reason, I would see the trust responsibility and peoplehood as cumulative factors in any Indian law case, serving different functions.51
I assume, however, that Professor Goldberg-Ambrose intends
the trust responsibility to be a constitutional limit on Congress as an
49. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1,at 179.
50. See id. at 177-78. This use of the trust responsibility may have some real effect
in protecting the tribes. It is also true, however, that the Court regularly overlooks the
canons when it suits its purpose to do so. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 47, at 1175-89.
It is therefore risky to look to the trust responsibility theory alone for protection of the
tribes.
51. Thus, Professor Frickey explains of practical reason: "Argument tends to be
cumulative rather than linear, for an argument that draws some support from several
values resonating in the legal interpretive community will usually be stronger than one
that follows deductively from only one value." Frickey, supra note 47, at 1217.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:191

alternative to the Indians-as-peoples approach, and not just a guide
for interpreting statutes. If I am right in that assumption, I think
that there are reasons to doubt that her approach would be "at least
as serviceable as" the Indians-as-peoples approach. First, the tradition lying behind the fiduciary responsibility as a constitutional doctrine is one of deference to Congress and infantilization of the
Indians. The government owes the tribes a trust obligation, but like
any good guardian, Congress must use its own judgment to determine how best to treat its incompetent wards. Thus, Chief Justice
Marshall described the trust obligation to Indians in American law:
"[T]hey are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. ' '5 2 Yet Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose offers this case as an example of the kind of contextual restraint that she thinks the trust responsibility might provide.5 3 Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, in a case that
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose quotes on another point,54 the Court
explained that Congress' power over Indians was plenary because
the government owed them a fiduciary duty: "From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of
the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power." 55 And again, the Court explained that Congress could violate its treaties with the Indians because it must keep its hands free
to execute its obligation, regardless of the Indians' wishes: To hold
otherwise "would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the
treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority
of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians...
'56
if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained."
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose might respond that these cases,
while still good law for the most part, are all old. A modern fiduciary obligation, especially one recognized as of constitutional dimen52.
53.
54.
55.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 179 n.54, 184 n.78.
See id. at 182.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). Elaborating, a later Court

said of the Pueblos' relation to the federal government:
Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive
modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism [sic], and
chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people....
[T]hey have been regarded and treated by the United States as requiring
special consideration and protection, like other Indian communities.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
56. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903).
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sion, might by contrast provide some real protection. The problem
with this argument is simply that its promise is disproved by reality.
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose recommends in so many words that
the Court do what it in fact it has done: adopt a fiduciary obligation
standard of review for Indian-specific statutes.5 7 But that standard
has proved to offer virtually no protection." The Court has not
struck down a single statute under the standard. It has explained
that the standard does not prevent Congress from disadvantaging
Indian tribes or individuals relative to non-Indians. And it has begun to cite toothless economic rational basis cases to explain the
fiduciary obligation standard.5 9 I can think of no more convincing
contextual evidence that the "norms and traditions" of the trust obligation do not in fact stimulate the Court to "critical thinking."
Even Professor Goldberg-Ambrose admits that the Court has never
"pressed for Armageddon with Congress."w
Finally, I think that this whole slide into quiescence could have
been predicted from the beginning, because there is no plausible textual peg on which to hang the fiduciary duty as a constitutional
limit. I can find no language in the description of Congress' article
I powers that remotely creates a trust responsibility. If I could, and
if I had any confidence that the Court would enforce it, this approach might be my preferred option too. But the Indian Commerce Clause simply gives Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce... with the Indian tribes"; it does not mention an obli6
gation of any kind. '
57. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 175.
58. For example: Professor Goldberg-Ambrose argues that the result in United
States v. Antelope may have been consistent with the fiduciary responsibility; for evidence, she points to the government's brief, which lists ways that the jurisdictional arrangement at issue nominally helped the Indians. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1,
at 179. But significantly, the Court did not bother to point out the ways that the scheme
helped the Indians; instead, it cursorily observed that under the fiduciary obligation
standard, Congress may help or hurt the Indians. See Williams, supra note 4, at 788.
59. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose also maintains that I falsely assert that the Court
has "formally" abandoned the trust obligation standard. In fact, Indians as Peoples

does not claim that the Court hasformally renounced the standard; rather, I argue that
the Court has functionally done so. It has begun to cite economic rational basis cases to
explain the standard, and it has stopped using the languge of trust obligation. See Williams, supra note 4, at 791-92.
60. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 177. Frickey, on whom Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose relies for her observations about practical reason, finds a sharp contrast in the Court's work in the Indian law area: the Court has been fairly ready to
invoke the trust responsibility in interpreting statutes, but has observed almost complete
deference at the constitutional level. See Frickey, supra note 47, at 1215.
61. In one footnote, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose briefly asserts that there is a textual basis for the trust reponsibility in the Constitution and treaties. See Goldberg-
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The trust obligation standard thus offers Indians virtually no
protection itself, and because it is a substitute for strict scrutiny, it
also deprives the Indians of protection under the equal protection
norm. Under the article I approach, Indians are uniquely vulnerable among racial minorities to legislative whim. Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose does offer an alternative version of the trust obligation as a "limit on federal power"-a "responsibility for mitigating the consequences [of the conquest] by preserving Indian
resources and self-government. '62 I applaud that vision, but I see
Ambrose, supra note 1,at 179 n.54. As for a textual basis in treaties, that point is
irrelevant to my argument that the Constitution does not offer a textual basis for a constitutionally required trust responsibility. As for the textual basis in the Constitution,
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose argues that the phrase "Indian tribes" in the Indian Commerce Clause implicitly contains the idea that the federal government owes the tribes a
trust responsibility. She derives this idea from Justice Marshall's claim that the Commerce Clause implicitly distinguishes "Indian tribes" from "foreign nations" and
"states." See id. But Marshall concludes from this language only that the Constitution
did not mean to include Indian tribes as foreign nations or states for purposes of the
Court's original jurisdiction. He never suggests that the Constitution freezes them into
the particular status of "domestic dependent nations" or that it creates a binding legal
obligation toward them. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1831).
Rather, he derives their status as "domestic dependent nations" from the language of
treaties and so implicitly recognizes that Congress-through treaties-may contour the
relationship with the tribes as it likes. See id.at 15-16. And that line of analysis is only
common-sensical: the Constitution does distinguish the tribes from foreign nations and
states but says absolutely nothing about whether the federal government owes them a
trust responsibility.
When Professor Clinton first offered the article I argument, he offered a different
textual analysis: he observed that the Indian Commerce Clause limited Congress' powers to "commerce" with Indians. As a result, in Clinton's view, the power did not
extend to internal tribal decisions. But as I have argued, the Court's dramatic expansion of the term "commerce" makes it unlikely that this formal limit will be much of a
real one. See Newton, FederalPower Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 237-39 (1984); Williams, supra note 4, at 770.
62. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 177. I should add-because Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose believes that I "grossly underemphasize" this consideration-that I
do not agree with her underlying claim about "what makes Indians uniquely entitled to
special federal measures." Id. at 184. She explains: "[I]f
Indians do not have a protected land base and some substantial measure of self-determination, Indian culture will
fade and ultimately disappear .... Yet unlike other American ethnic groups, Indians
cannot rely on perpetuation of their tradition in a home country abroad. If Indian
culture vanishes in America, it vanishes altogether." Id. at 184. Constraints of space
prevent me from developing my objections to this claim, but they are essentially two. I
agree that without special protection, Indians will lose their culture, and that result
would be a tragedy. But Indians are not unique in that regard, and in any event, the
preservation of culture as culture does not seem to me a morally appealing basis for
Indian law.
First, Indians are not unique in facing assimilation with no "home" country to
preserve their culture. Ashkenazi Jews, for example, preserve in parts of America an
Eastern European Yiddish culture that is threatened in their home countries and has
changed beyond recognition in Israel. See T. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSA-
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no reason to expect that the Court will adopt it as a check on
Congress.
Thus, the trust responsibility offers little protection because the
whole context of Indian law is one of congressional dominance. Reworking those materials seems to me to offer limited promise for the
63
tribes. Like Nell Jessup Newton's work, Indians as Peoples therefore tries to draw on a different set of "norms and traditions"-the
judicially critical attitude associated with strict scrutiny. Judges
should never forget that Indian law deals with a historically oppressed racial minority; we know that "carefully scrutinizing" radoes "reverberat[e] with prior legal
cially specific legislation
64
tradition."'
doctrinal
I therefore begin with the presumption that all Indian-specific
legislation should get a very hard look by the courts, because within
this legislation there could be an equal protection violation. Courts
can, however, validate such legislation, but only if the legislation "is
consistent with recognition of their separate peoplehood and does
' 65
not reflect a view of Indians strictly as a race." Courts would be
driven to make this assessment with care because the surrounding
context is one of presumptive strict scrutiny: they must rigorously
examine the legislation to ensure that it really does qualify as peoplehood-supportive. If courts ensure that Congress singles out the
Indians only in a manner which is consistent with their peoplehood,
then tribes may act "as a buffer between individual Indians and the
66
hand of the federal government"; peoplehood might thus supply
LEM 284-321, 451-90 (1989). Many Jews believe that this culture will be dead within

two generations, yet I cannot believe that Goldberg-Ambrose would offer them a system
like that created by Title 25. In addition, many American ethnic cultures have become
distinctly American, so that they no longer mirror the "home" culture, however much
they may retain connections to it. If African-American culture disappears in this country, for example, "it vanishes altogether"; it will not continue in Ghana or Kenya.
More fundamentally, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's view seems to value preservation of a culture over the experience of persons. The great value of tribal self-determination for her seems to be the continuation of tribal cultures as cultures. But for nonIndian Americans facing loss of their own ethnic identity, the knowledge that their
culture will continue in the old country may not much ameliorate their sense of loss.
Similarly, under Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's reasoning, American Sioux should not
be too upset at losing their culture as long as Canadian Sioux carry it on. Most disturbingly, if a given reservation should lose much of its distinctive native culture, Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose offers little reason to continue to protect its self-determination.
63. Newton, supra note 61, at 286-88. I differ from Newton, however, in that I
would apply strict scrutiny only to Indian-specific legislation inconsistent with tribal
peoplehood.
64. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 178.
65. Id. at 171.
66. Williams, supra note 4, at 843.
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protection in lieu of strict scrutiny. 67 Again, by contrast, the context of the trust responsibility is one of presumptive legislative validity: Congress has the power do whatever it thinks best. For that
reason, the Indians-as-peoples view might extend greater constitutional protection to the tribes than the article I approach.
IV.

THE PRACTICALITY OF INDIANS AS PEOPLES

Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers two basic arguments that
the Indians-as-peoples approach will not reduce the vulnerability of
Indians to federal action. First, if adopted, the approach could
work some positive harm to nontribal Indians. But second and
more likely, courts will just not adopt my proposed analysis.
As to the first, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose points out that
my approach would have one distinctly negative consequence: it
would require courts to look more skeptically at special benefits
granted to Indians as a racial group. 68 There is a core of truth in
this point, and I regret it. It is important, however, to keep this
point in perspective. First, some nontribal Indians may still partake
of enough peoplehood, even without formal tribal ties, that special

benefits would be constitutional; courts would have to proceed on a
case-by-case basis. Second, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose argues in
particular that Congress could not make special provisions for the
special nature of Indians' religious practice. 69 As Susan Williams
and I have argued elsewhere, however, the better place to look for

special protection of the Indians' unusual religious practice is the
67. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose opines that this suggestion "rests on a highly unrealistic view of reservation life" because "the federal government can still exercise pervasive influence over reservation life, because of tribal dependence on federal funding
and federal regulation of trust property." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 190. But
Indians as Peoples recognizes that the federal government exercises daily influence on
Indian Country; it offers several protections for the tribe as a buffer. First, some federal
influence is not inconsistent with tribal peoplehood: tribes can still structure much of
reservation life. See Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place:A South Dakota Essay, 34
S.D.L. REV.246, 249 (1989); Williams, supra note 4, at 843. (Similarly, in international
law, "[p]eoplehood is consistent with a certain amount of internalization within a
larger, protecting country." Williams, supra note 4, at 862.) Second and more importantly, under my proposed approach, each Indian-specfic federal action-like funding
and regulation of trust property-must be consistent with a view of Indians as peoples.
See Williams, supra note 4, at 844-45.
68. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 189; Williams, supra note 4, at 845
n.277.
69. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 189 n.103.
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Free Exercise Clause: not70 only should it be allowed, it should be
constitutionally required.
Third, my approach is not unique in distinguishing Indians as
a race from Indians as tribes. As Professor Goldberg-Ambrose ob71
serves, the Court makes the same distinction; and despite her
protestations, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's approach does so as
well. As she admits, the Indian Commerce Clause gives Congress
power over Indian tribes, not individuals. She argues, however, that
the "Indians not taxed" language of the Fourteenth Amendment
implicitly expands Congress' power, because it refers to individuals. 72 But the drafters of the Amendment intended that language to
refer to tribal Indians, not racial Indian individuals. One could ignore the history of the provision and look only at the text, but the
text refers to Indians not taxed, and there are no such Indians anymore.73 The only way to avoid that conclusion is to look at the
history, but that move brings us back to reading the language as
"tribal Indians."
Finally, I maintain only that Indians as a race should receive
the same treatment as other minority races receive as races. But
one might reinterpret the Equal Protection Clause in ways to allow
expanded protection for all minority groups, and I would applaud
many of those new readings. Ultimately, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose is correct that I do not think that Indians as a race should
74
receive different treatment from other races as races. I do not
think that a nontribal Indian, raised off reservation with no connection to a separate people and no intention of creating one, stands in
a meaningfully different position from an African-American raised
under similar circumstances, simply because of the accident of
genes. Both, perhaps, should receive special treatment, but I see no
reason to distinguish them.
But Professor Goldberg-Ambrose plainly thinks it unlikely
that any of these problems will come to pass, because she has a
70. See Williams & Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 769 (1991). Moreover, even if the Court does not read the Free Exercise Clause to
require special protection, Congress can still make special allowance for the Indians'
religious practice, as long as it does so for every other comparable religious practice.
See id. at 849-50.
71. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 189.

72. Id. at 189-90.
73. See supra p. 205.
74. I develop this point at length at Williams, supra note 4, at 813-23. Professor

Golberg-Ambrose does offer another distinction between Indians as a race and other
races-her "cultural damage" argument-but as I have argued above, see supra note
62, I do not think it a convincing or attractive way to single out Native Americans.
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more fundamental objection to Indians as Peoples: she doubts that
courts will ever adopt its suggested approach. 75 She writes: "I
doubt whether American courts will be willing to abdicate their interpretive role to the vagaries of definitions emerging from international politics. . . . Furthermore, even if American courts were
willing.., the difficulties of applying any definition of 'peoples' are
formidable."' 76 But if courts do not act to protect Indian self-determination, then all that Indians as Peoples has done is to tempt
courts to "seize upon its forcefully presented equal protection critique and discard its rather contrived plan for eluding the grasp of
strict scrutiny."'77 So the article may leave Indians in a worse state
than it found them.
These comments present real problems and threats, and I do
not want to minimize them. I do, however, want to compare them
to the alternatives. First, assume that courts do take from Indians
as Peoples only the equal protection critique and not my proposed
reformulation. Even if that happens, the tribes would be no worse
off than they are today. Under present law, tribal Indians as tribal
Indians are already without protection under the antidiscrimination
norm of the Fifth Amendment, as they would be under Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose's own article I approach. And if courts were
inclined to accept the equal protection critique without the reformulation, they might have done so before now. As Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose points out, 7 8 I am not the first to observe that
Mancari is in error, nor am I now the last: Professor GoldbergAmbrose herself joins me on this point.
Second, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose complains that my standard would be difficult to apply, and I think she is right in that
contention. But again, compare the alternative: the "trust responsibility" is notoriously, perhaps definitionally, vague. It simply tells
the government to do what is best for the Indians. In constructing a
75. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers a final objection that, I think, grows out of
a misreading of Indians as Peoples. She observes that I maintain that "the values of
equal protection can no more apply to Indian tribes than they can to a foreign government." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 188. She apparently gathers from this
language that I meant to argue that under current law the equal protection clause binds

tribal governments. I certainly did not mean to make that argument; indeed at one
point I specifically repudiate it; see Williams, supra note 4, at 805. As Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose observes, the "real question is whether the federal government, in
its dealings with tribes, must adhere to the standards of equal protection." GoldbergAmbrose, supra note 1, at 188.
76. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 187.
77. Id. at 172; see id. at 187-88.
78. Id. at 172.
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constitutional trust obligation, the Court therefore has two options.
First, it may make the obligation mean nothing (or whatever Congress wants it to mean); that option is the one that the Court has in
fact adopted, but it leaves the Indians without protection. Second,
it might actually give the obligation some substantive content. To
do so, however, the Court must decide what is best for the Indians,
out of the almost infinite range of possibilities, and then review each
statute with that policy in mind. 79 The Indians-as-peoples view at
least focuses the inquiry somewhat: courts must decide on a context-by-context basis whether tribal sovereignty is a reality on a
given reservation. I would develop a clearer standard if I could find
one, but I think that this is the view that the legislative materials of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the moral reality of the Indians
suggests. If it should ever be adopted, I would hope that courts
80
could bring greater determinacy to it over time.
But Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's final objection is that she
thinks it highly unlikely that courts will ever adopt my standard,
because it would involve abandoning their "interpretive role" for
' 81
the "vagaries of definitions emerging from international politics.
But I do not suggest that the courts abandon their role as interpreters of the text: my standard is an interpretation of the language of
the Constitution with, I think, strong roots in its legislative history.
By contrast, the trust reponsibility has roots in neither the constitutional language or debates. In addition, I emphatically do not mean
for American courts simply to adopt "definitions [of peoplehood]
emerging from international politics"; I contemplate a careful
evolution of standards over time, tailored to the particular condition of the tribes and responsive to the language and tradition of the
Constitution. I offer international law definitions simply to illustrate the idea of peoplehood and to provide a starting point for discussion. 82 Finally, this view of the Indians as peoples is hardly a
79. Thus, Philip Frickey has argued that the Court could not find a "judicially
manageable" duty in the General Allotment Act, because the language of that statute
could give rise only to "some general, undefined . . . duties out of whole cloth."
Frickey, supra note 47, at 1182-83. By comparison, a constitutional trust doctrine
would be even more vague and "out of whole cloth"; the language of the GAA may be
vague, but the Constitution has no language setting up a trust responsibility.
80. See Williams, supra note 4, at 843.
81. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1,at 187.
82. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose suggests that "Indians as Peoples does not seem
to be aware of the range of groups "recognized as 'tribes' under American law today."
She apparently bases this suggestion on the fact that certain tribes have "land bases of

more than a few acres and no more than a dozen members" and "it is not clear to me
[Professor Goldberg-Ambrose] how such groups would fare if measured against the
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new idea in the materials of Indian law.8 3 Far from being "contrived,"' 84 it seems to me to be a natural conclusion from the history,
language, and policy of the Constitution.
So Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's strongest argument, I think,
is that courts will not adopt my standard because it is vague. Perhaps she is right: the standard is "at this point, quite vague."' 5 But
again, it is less vague than the trust obligation standard that both
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose and the Court have endorsed.8 6 My
hope was that my critique of Mancari would stir courts to look for
another answer, because otherwise-with Mancari gone-all of Title 25 would receive strict scrutiny. By contrast, in context and
hard fact, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose just promises more of the
same. She endorses one of the Court's article I arguments (what I
have called the "express reference" argument: since the Indian
Commerce Clause expressly refers to Indians as a group, so may
ordinary legislation) and the fiduciary responsibility standard of review. Perhaps the courts will not rush to adopt Indians as Peoples,
but at least it represents an attempt to move in more positive directions by invoking the courts' traditional care about racially specific
statutes.
In that sense, Indians as Peoples does not abandon context in
favor of "abstract reasoning and inventive formulations"; rather it
seeks to shift context from one of pure Indian law to one of mixed
Indian law and constitutional law. The movement, among legal
academics, toward contextual analysis and practical reason is one
that I find powerful and exciting,8 7 but its danger is that it might
rob analysis of critical edge by simply ratifying context. 88 The answer that some contextualists give to this threat is some version of
international definition of 'peoples'." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 187 n.90.
But again, the international definitions are just a useful starting point, an illustration of
the range of relevant considerations. Courts applying the standard would necessarily
have to develop and modify the international idea of peoplehood to respond to the
American context.
83. See, e.g., Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883); Frickey, supra note 47,
at 1189-1200.
84. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 172.
85. Williams, supra note 4, at 843.
86. Again, Frickey, upon whom Goldberg-Ambrose relies, believes that the Court
declined to find a trust responsibility in the General Allotment Act because such a duty
would be too vague. See Frickey, supra note 47, at 1182-83.
87. See Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia, - YALE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 1991).
88. See Frickey, supra note 47, at 1219, 1226, 1230 n.435; Singer, Property and
Coercion in FederalIndianLaw: The Conflict Between Criticaland Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1824 (1990).
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the "immanent critique": we use some parts of existing culture to

9
My hope in
critique other parts, to move forward dialectically.
Indians as Peoples was that the materials of constitutional law-the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the antidiscrimination
norm-might supply the critical edge that Indian law did not seem
to offer. From within Indian law, this shift may seem like an abandonment of context, because it draws on different materials and traditions. But it really is an attempt to cross-pollinate contexts, to
formulate an answer that neither context alone could supply. I find
that kind of discussion, like this colloquy with Professor GoldbergAmbrose, enormously fruitful and illuminating.

89. See Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 291, 360-68 (1985); Frickey, supra note 47, at 1225-26, 1230 n.435;
Michelman, supra note 47, at 32-33; Singer, supra note 88, at 1838-41.

